Off-Ramp

^{Russische Bombenangriffe auf Kramatorsk}

Die klugen Analysen zum aktuelle Krieg sollte man nicht in deutschen Medien suchen. Die sind besoffen von Emotionen, die man nur wegbekäme, sperrte man die Journaille für eine Weile ein und zwänge sie dazu, Machiavelli auswendig zu lernen. Oder Bücher über Machtpolitik. Ich kann nur einen Artikel von Tom McTague in The Atlantik empfehlen, der vor einer irrationalen Eskalation des Ganzen warnt: „Putin Needs an Off-Ramp“.

When a gambler has already lost so much that he will go bankrupt unless he can turn it around, the logical thing for him to do is to continue upping the stakes. This is the desperate opponent the West may now face. Worse: This is the opponent whose bloodstained debts the West may have to to write off. (…)

But Western leaders should also recognize the dangers of talking themselves into an even worse situation than already exists, and must be clear about their goals. Do they seek a way to end the conflict, or Russia’s defeat?

The question for Western leaders is how to ensure Putin is defeated while nevertheless providing him with a route out of the crisis and avoiding any missteps that could lead to a wider conflagration. The path along the cliff edge is precarious. (…)

^{Untertitel in russischen Medien sinngemäß: Bei Kiew ist so viel Verkehr wie in Moskau zur Hauptverkehrszeit.}

First, the West must ensure that however much support it gives to Kyiv, the conflict remains one between Ukraine and Russia. That way, peace negotiations remain between the two countries, and not Russia and the West more widely. Washington, Paris, London, and Berlin cannot allow talks to become what Putin wants them to be: a negotiation about spheres of influence in which Ukraine and other states can be bargained away. This, in effect, would be a victory for Putin and his tactics of nuclear brinkmanship, leading to a more dangerous world in which other dictators take the lesson that bullying and intimidation work.

Second, the West must not close off potential compromises that the Ukrainians themselves would be willing to negotiate. If Putin is to accept a negotiated defeat, he will require a fig leaf to hide the reality that he has failed to subdue Ukraine. There has been speculation, for example, that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky might be prepared to formally renounce his pursuit of NATO membership, one of a number of pledges that could be made to serve as a pretext for Russian de-escalation. Zelensky could also promise not to send troops into the Donbas, for example, or seek to retake Crimea—or even to seek nuclear weapons, or allow them to be stationed on Ukrainian territory. In other words, he could use Russia’s absurd propaganda to his advantage by formally pledging not to do things that he or any of his successors would have considered doing anyway. (…)

Ultimately, diplomacy will have to get each side to agree to a deal that allows each to save its dignity—even though one side does not deserve to have its dignity saved.

Der schreibt wie ein geübter Mediator. Ich fürchte nur, dass solche Leute keinen Einfluss haben oder bekommen werden. Ein anderer sehr nachdenklicher und kenntnisreicher Artikel wurde schon bei Fefe empfohlen: „Die Politik der USA war es immer, zu verhindern, dass Deutschland und Russland enger zusammenarbeiten – Historische, politische und wirtschaftliche Hintergründe des Ukraine-Kriegs“.

^{Untertitel in russischen Medien sinngemäß: Bei Kiew ist so viel Verkehr wie in Moskau zur Hauptverkehrszeit.}